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THE DOWNSTREAM PEOPLE: TREATING INDIAN TRIBES
AS STATES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT
JOHN S. HARBISON*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE DOWNSTREAM PEOPLE
In the early summer of 1763, a party of French adventurers led by
Father Jacques Marquette, a Jesuit priest, and Louis Joliet, a cours de
bois, came upon a group of villages at the confluence of the Arkansas
and Mississippi Rivers. The villagers were Siouan speakers who called
themselves the Quapaw, or Downstream People.l Exactly when the
Quapaw moved into the lower Arkansas watershed is not certain, but their
entry on the scene was concurrent, evidently, with the migration of four
cognate groups, the Osage, Kanza, Ponka, and Omaha, into the region
that now lies within the states of Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Kansas. Nor
were the Quapaw the only members of this loose affiliation who named
themselves with reference to human geography. Their kinsmen, the
Omaha, were the Upstream People. 2 In fact, the Quapaw and Omaha
recognized a fundamental ecological and economic truth: in the
watersheds in which we live, all of us are Upstream or Downstream
People, and most of us are both. As Upstream and Downstream People,
we exist in a complex web of ecological and economic connections with
our watersheds and with each other. The degradation of many of our
rivers is a conspicuous example of our failure to take these connections
into full account.
The policy question that prompts this paper is whether Indian tribes
should be given regulatory authority (like states) under the Clean Water
Act. As someone who enthusiastically supports the enlargement of tribal
sovereignty, 3 I am tempted to say "of course they should." Instead, I
offer a warning inspired by the Up and Downstream People: we do not
need more political fragmentation of our water quality programs, but
less. My principal concern is that empowering tribes to establish their
own water quality standards and unilaterally enforce them upstream will
lead us further away from integrated watershed management. Watershed
management has become a shiboleth in policy circles for environ-
* Associate Research Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. I owe much to Bob Laurence,
Susan Pilcher, Rebecca Tsosie, Judith Royster, Jim Grijalva, Angie Elsperger, Nick Chase and Amy
Oatfield, who know why.
1. For the history of the Quapaw, see W. DAVtD B AMD, THE QUAPAw INDtANs: A H LSTORY OF THE
DowNSTREAM PEOPLE (1980).
2. See VELMA SEAMSTER NIEBERDiNG, THE QUAPAWS (THOSE WHO WENT DowNSTREAM) 1-3
(1976).
3. See John S. Harbison, The Broken Promise Land: An Essay on Native American Tribal
Sovereignty over Reservation Resources, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 1995).
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mentally sensitive regulatory programs, 4 and buzzwords, we all know,
tend "to carry powerful prescriptive and hortatory meanings but lack
descriptive specificity." 5 The watershed management concept, however,
is respectably concrete. 6 My goal is to encourage tribes to use the
leverage they would acquire by being treated as states under the Clean
Water Act to promote a watershed approach to water quality protection.
In Part II of this article, I provide some essential background to this
issue by describing the basic regulatory structure of the Clean Water Act
and introducing the notion of Clean Water Act federalism. Part II also
relates Clean Water Act federalism to tribal state relations. This
institutional background is important, for as William Goldfarb has
pointed out, "[t]he trend toward watershed management is a response to
... A) [t]ransboundary water management problems; B) [i]mplications
of federalism and separation of powers; and C) [v]ariability of water law
among political units."7 The fact is that the current structure of Clean
Water Act federalism-based as it is on political, rather than geographic
boundaries-does not correspond with the physical reality of numerous
water quality problems. As a result, water quality management is rife
with jurisdictional conflicts and substantive uncertainty.
In Part III, I show that from an economic perspective, Clean Water
Act federalism as it is currently structured is inefficient. It is inefficient
in the sense that some level of degradation is economically optimal, and
that this optimal level will not likely be achieved in a multijurisdictional
watershed. But Part III also demonstrates that an economically optimal
level of pollution (or cleanliness) is even more unlikely to be achieved
by nationalizing water quality standards. Localized standards are always
more efficient than national standards, and the relevant locality for the
purpose of achieving optimality is a jurisdictionally integrated water-
shed. Watershed management is not only more likely to be environ-
mentally sound; it is also more likely to be economically efficient
because it permits the complete internalization of all the costs of both
environmental degradation and remediation. In fact, this is an important
way in which sound environmentalism and good economics converge.
4. For a non-technical introduction to the concept of watershed management see ENTERING THE
WATERSHED: A NEW APPROACH TO SAVE AMERICA'S RIVER ECOSYSTEMS (Doppelt et al., eds. 1993)
(stressing advantages from an environmental perspective). For a more scientifically rigorous
introduction, see WATERSHED M ANAOEMENr. BALANCNG S UsTANANmrrY AND E NVIRONmErAL C HANGE
(RJ. Naiman, ed. 1994).
5. William Goldfarb, Watershed Management: Slogan or Solution?, 21 B.C. ENVIL AFF. L. REV.
483,483 (1994).
6. See infra notes 83-100 and accompanying text (discussing watershed management concepts).
7. Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 483.
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In Part IV, I conclude with a few remarks on watershed planning.
Like ecosystem management, sustainable development, and biodiversity
preservation, watershed planning is meant to convey the notion of a
more holistic approach to environmental management than has been
tried in the past. Each of these concepts has become a catch phrase in
current environmental policy, but we are only beginning to understand
what they would mean in practical terms if we were to put them into
action. Part IV looks briefly at an ambitious effort on the Tennessee
River to implement watershed planning. One thing clear from the
Tennessee experience is that there are serious institutional obstacles to
basinwide planning. Certainly, no tribal government could be expected
to shoulder the burden of basinwide organization in a large watershed,
but I do conclude that tribes can and should use the bargaining power
that comes with regulatory authority to further a new version of Clean
Water Act federalism based on the watershed approach.
II. CURRENT CLEAN WATER ACT FEDERALISM
A. STRUCTURE OF TIM CLEAN WATE ACT
In the structure of the Clean Water Act, there is a faultline. On one
side, the statute calls for the enforcement of nationally uniform,
technology based effluent limitations intended to reduce or stop
pollution at the end of a discharge pipe. On the other, the statute calls
for locally determined, water quality based effluent standards applicable
to the receiving water. Here, I want to describe briefly the features of
this bifurcated regulatory system. In doing so, I want to set the stage for
a discussion of pollution optimality. The existence of both national and
local effluent limitations produces a tension along this faultline that I can
illustrate by depicting a hypothetical river that I call the Freestone, a
classic cold water trout stream.
Section 306 of the Clean Water Act, the source of technology based
limitations, requires that new industrial sources utilize pollution controls
that reflect "the greatest degree of effluent reduction which the
Administrator determines to be achievable through application of the
best available demonstrated control technology, processes, operating
methods, or other alternatives."s The technologies required by these
new source performance standards are nationally uniform and unrelated
to the water quality objectives of any given watershed. New industrial
sources that comply with them are then exempted for ten years from
more stringent controls. The exemption is an award for voluntary
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (1988).
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compliance, and perhaps justifiable given the large capital investment
compliance may require. The exemption is not complete, however, for it
does not apply to more stringent pollution controls needed to achieve
state water quality based standards. 9
On this other side of the Clean Water Act faultline, Section 303 calls
for water quality based effluent limitations to be imposed on polluters
when technology based limitations will not result in attainment of the
local water quality standard. 10 First, the state classifies the types of uses
that will be made of its waters. It then determines which pollution
criteria should be associated with each use-or, in other words, the
maximum concentrations of scheduled pollutants that can occur without
making a given use unachievable. Next, it seeks approval of its use and
criteria determinations from the federal Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), which reviews them to ensure that the criteria will achieve
the classified uses. 11 Finally, the state applies its use and criteria
classifications to specified stream segments within its borders.
Let us say, for example, that the state decides to designate a segment
of the Freestone River as Class A. In other words, this segment would be
used for recreation, primarily trout fishing. Trout generally insist on
well oxygenated water. They can survive in low oxygen levels only
when the water temperature is low, so in the summer it is particularly
important that the waters of the Freestone are oxygen saturated. They
also need enough dissolved nutrients in the water to support the aquatic
plant life that is the bottom link of the trout food chain, but a nutrient
level too high could lead to fishery disaster by depleting the river's
oxygen. 12 The problem is that agriculture, and the extraction of water
for domestic and industrial uses, can make the water warmer (increasing
the need for dissolved oxygen) and richer in dissolved nutrients
(potentially depleting whatever dissolved oxygen there is). If the state
wanted to preserve the recreational values of the Freestone, it would
develop water quality based standards to deal with these problems. The
state might say, for example, that there must be no less than twenty parts
per million of dissolved oxygen in July and August. 13 To achieve this
9. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1988).
11. For a case in which a state challenged EPA's disapproval of its water quality standards, see
Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1980). Could a polluter
challenge a state's water quality standard by arguing that it is too stringent with respect to the
contemplated uses? See Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279 (D.S.D. 1979) (yes). The
leading law review article on the subject is Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water
Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 36 VAm. L. REv. 1167 (1983).
12. Interview with Susan L. Pilcher, a Very Knowledgeable Person about trout and their waters,
at her breakfast table, Fayetteville, Arkansas (February 5, 1995).
13. The state is going to be concerned about a number of other things that might affect water
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goal, the state would apply water quality based limitations against new
industrial nutrient sources in the Freestone watershed more stringent than
the national technology based limitations already in effect.
To implement this new standard, the state would obtain EPA
approval of its own National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES).14 The NPDES permit program is the point of contact between
technology based and water quality based limitations. This means that
the permit must be written in a way that allows translation between
technology and water quality standards, not easy for anyone with a tin
ear for environmental engineering. The permitting process involves
bargain and compromise between the EPA, the state, and the permittee.
In part, this is because technology standards and water quality standards
do not fit together seamlessly. In part, it is because the permit may be
tailored to a site specific situation. William Rodgers describes the permit
process like this:
[t]he ultimate standards of compliance, notably the
fishable/swimmable and no discharge goals and the various
"best technology" formulations, are decidedly aspirational in
tone, strongly suggesting definition by bargaining, exchange,
and compromise .... The "schedule of compliance" extends
over time, and the same can be said of the relationship between
the permittee and the agency. Reporting, monitoring, and
other permit duties assure that polluter agency contact is
frequent, is built upon sporadic exchanges of information, and
results in incremental decisions (disregarding that upset,
overlooking this reporting deadline, construing ambiguity in
that way).15
Regulation by bargaining may not have been intended by Congress
when it enacted the Clean Water Act, but it certainly should have been
expected.16 A state NPDES program may entail the issuance of
thousands of permits, each involving numerous determinations.
The example of the Freestone, to which I will return, is highly
simplified, since it singles out one resource value and a limited set of
quality, of course, such as turbidity, salinity, and acidity, which affect fisheries. In fact, its most
troublesome and difficult problem may be inorganic toxics that are ingested and magnified in the food
chain. Id.
14. Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1988). In 1993, 37 states had obtained EPA
approval of NPDES permit programs. WL.IAM H. RoDoERs,JR.,ENV-ONmENALLAW 363 n.15 (2d
ed. 1994).
15. RonDmRs, supra note 14, at 364 (footnotes omitted).
16. For a case study of regulation-by-bargaining, and an argument that it is expectable when the
regulator and the regulated party have long-term, ongoing relations, see John S. Harbison, Hard Times
in the Softwoods: Contract Terms, Performance, and Relational Interests in National Forest Timber
Sales, 21 ENVrL. L. 863 (1991).
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pollution problems. Most Clean Water Act regulatory programs are far
more complex. This will be clear from the discussion of pollution
optimality in Part III, where the Freestone will figure prominently. But
before reaching that point, I want to show how the regulatory faultline
just decribed is exposed in a political system in which jurisdictional
boundaries often cut across geographic watersheds. And as the
optimality discussion in Part III will show, this fracturing of regulatory
authority increases the tension generated by the underlying fault.
B. DOWNSTREAM STATES
When the Upstream People in one state discharge effluents into a
river that are carried downstream to a second state, do the Downstream
People have any recourse under the Clean Water Act? Which state's
substantive law applies? What remedies are available? In two recent
cases, International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,17 and Arkansas v.
Oklahoma,I8 the Supreme Court started to explore these questions.
Ouellette arose out of a nuisance suit brought by Vermont landowners
on the Vermont side of Lake Champlain in a Vermont state court against
a pulp mill located on the New York side of the lake. 19 The pulp mill
was operating in compliance with an NPDES permit issued by the state
of New York. 2 0 Arkansas involved the discharge of effluent from
Fayetteville, Arkansas's wastewater treatment plant into an unnamed
tributary of the Illinois River twenty two miles above the Arkansas
Oklahoma border. 2 1 The treatment plant was operating under an
NPDES permit issued by the EPA, because the state of Arkansas had not
yet received approval of its own NPDES program. 22 The holdings and
dicta of these cases answer some basic questions, while raising others.
The main question in Ouellette was whether the landowners could
obtain damages and injunctive relief in the Vermont court under
Vermont nuisance law.23 The Court held that the Clean Water Act
precludes a downstream state from using its nuisance law to impose more
stringent pollution controls than are required under the NPDES permit.24
This holding was not surprising, though it has been criticized.25 The
17. 479 U.S.481 (1987).
18. 112S. Ct. 1046(1992).
19. 479 U.S. 481,484 (1987).
20. Id. at 490 n.10.
21. 112 S. Ct. 1046,1051 (1992).
22. Id.
23. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 484.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., RoDxias, supra note 14, at 287 (asserting that the Court erred twice in methodology
and once in applying the substantive law).
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Court had previously held that the federal common law of interstate
water pollution, under which federal courts could require upstream states
to strengthen their water pollution regulations, was preempted by the
Clean Water Act. 26 Left open, though, is the prospect of obtaining a
nuisance remedy under the law of the upstream state. The Vermont
landowners could sue International Paper in a New York state court, or in
a federal court sitting in Vermont or New York, under New York
nuisance law. 27 The Downstream People can invoke the substantive law
of the polluter's state, which is not likely to be very different from their
own anyway. In fact, International Paper eventually settled with the
Vermont landowners, apparently to foreclose that possibility. 28
More important however, may be Ouellette's dicta regarding
federalism issues under the Clean Water Act. In this area, the Court said
that before an NPDES permit may be issued, an affected downstream
state must be given notice and an opportunity to object at a public
hearing, and the permitting state "must consider the objections and
recommendations ...before taking action." 29 The downstream state
cannot block the upstream state's permit decision, but it can petition the
EPA Administrator, who could veto a permit "if he concludes that the
discharges will have an undue impact on interstate waters." 30 But in
issuing the NPDES permit, does the upstream state have to do more than
take the downstream state's interest into consideration? That was the
issue addressed by the Supreme Court in Arkansas v. Oklahoma .31 In
Ouellette, the Court made some rather broad statements about the
inapplicability of the downstream state's law. 32  In Arkansas,
nevertheless, the EPA decided that the Clean Water Act requires an
NPDES permit to impose any effluent limitations needed to satisfy the
water quality standards of downstream states. 33 The Oklahoma effluent
standards provided that zero degradation of water quality would be
26. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981).
27. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 497.
28. RoDnes, supra note 14, at 288. What about an action under the Clean Water Act itself?
Section 505 of the statute, codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1987), allows citizen suits against polluters
for violations of effluent standards. Monetary damages are not awarded, but the civil penalties can be
stiff and attorneys fees are recoverable. In addition, Section 505 contains a bureaucracy-forcing
provision that allows a private action against the administering agency for failure to perform a non-
discretionary function. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h) (1988).
29. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 490. Presumably, these procedures could be invoked through a Section
505 citizen suit.
30. Id. at 491. For an instance in which this has happened, see Champion Int'l v. EPA, 850 F.2d
182, 185 (4th Cir. 1988), in which the Administrator vetoed a Tennessee NPDES permit issued to a
paper mill that polluted the Pigeon River 26 miles above the Tennessee-North Carolina border.
31. 112 S. Ct. 1046(1992).
32. See, e.g., Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 494 (noting that "the CWA precludes a court from applying
the law of an affected State against an out-of-state source").
33. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1051-52.
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allowed in the upper Illinois River, including the segment immediately
downstream from the Arkansas Oklahoma border. 34
The state of Arkansas argued that imposition of this standard in the
permit for the Fayetteville treatment plant was forbidden by Ouellette.35
The Supreme Court disagreed. Although the Court held that the Clean
Water Act does not require that NPDES permits meet downstream water
quality standards, it concluded that such a requirement was within the
discretionary powers of the EPA Administrator.3 6 Section 402 of the
Clean Water Act provides that "[t]he Administrator shall prescribe
conditions for such permits to assure compliance with the requirements
of [the statute] and such other requirements as he deems appropriate." 37
The Administrator had promulgated a regulation stating that no permit
would be issued "[w]hen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure
compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected
States." 38 The Court decided that this was "a perfectly reasonable
exercise of the Agency's statutory discretion . . . [because] [t]he
application of [downstream] state water quality standards in the interstate
context is wholly consistent with the Act's broad purpose." 39 The
purpose, in the words of the statute, is "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 40
The irony of Arkansas v. Oklahoma was that the segment of the Illinois
River in issue was already in violation of the Oklahoma water quality
standard. 4 1 Because it appeared that operation of the Fayetteville
treatment plant would not result in a detectable change in the river's
water quality, the EPA approved the NPDES permit.42 Theoretically, any
additional outfall pipe on the river would further degrade a river already
falling short of the applicable standards. But as the Court pointed out,
"if every discharge that had some theoretical impact on a downstream
State were interpreted as 'degrading' the downstream waters,
downstream States might wield an effective veto over upstream
discharges ."43
It should be noted, however, that the Court's decision merely limits
the range of such a veto. If the Fayetteville outfall pipe would have
resulted in detectable degradation of the already degraded Illinois, the
34. Id. at 1051.
35. Id. at 1056-57.
36. id. at 1056-57.
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2) (1988).
38. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d).
39. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1056.
40. Clean Water Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
41. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1052.
42. Id. at 1051.
43. Id. at 1059.
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EPA would have been unable to issue the City a permit under its
regulation. Would this have been a bad thing? Not necessarily. As the
Court of Appeals noted in its opinion in Oklahoma v. EPA,
[t]he full ramifications of Arkansas' formulation of the Clean
Water Act issue are exposed once it is realized that an upstream
state has the ability (if not the legal right) largely to control the
quality of the waters of a downstream state. It can accomplish
this simply by setting and enforcing its own water quality
standards and releasing water of that quality to the downstream
state. 44
This is the predicament of the Downstream People. By locating
regulatory authority along political boundaries-that is, by vesting it in
individual states as opposed to a collective association of all affected
parties-the Clean Water Act inevitably begets conflicts among upstream
and downstream users asserting superior rights.
How ought tribal sovereignty be accommodated in the Clean Water
Act's federal system? That is the last piece of background that must be
supplied before exploring the optimality issue in Part III.
C. CLEAN WATER ACT FEDERALISM AND TRIBAL-STATE RELATIONS
In 1987, Congress amended the Clean Water Act by adding Section
518, authorizing the EPA to treat Indian tribes as states for certain
regulatory purposes. 45 Most significantly, this allows a tribe to establish
its own water quality based effluent standards under Section 303 of the
Act.46 The tribe can designate the uses of water resources under its
jurisdiction and promulgate narrative and numerical standards designed
to protect the ascribed uses.47 Tribal discharge permits must comply
with these standards.48 The lesson of Arkansas, of course, is that permits
issued by upstream regulatory authorities must also be conditioned so as
to comply with the tribe's downstream effluent standards. In December,
1993, the EPA approved the first tribal water quality standards under
Section 518.49 The standards were promulgated by Isleta Pueblo, New
44. 908 F.2d 595,602 (10th Cir. 1990), revd by Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992).
The Court of Appeals held not only that the EPA was authorized by the Clean Water Act to impose
Oklahoma's downstream standards, but that the Fayetteville permit would violate the Clean Water Act
even though the treatment plant would not have resulted in detectable degradation, since the river was
already out of compliance. The Supreme Court agreed with the first part of this holding, but disagreed
with the last. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992).




49. New Mexico: Indian Pueblo Granted Authority by EPA to Set Water Quality Standards for
1995]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Mexico, and applied to waters within the tribe's jurisdiction.0 When the
EPA announced its approval of the Pueblo's standards, it indicated that
upstream dischargers would have to comply. 51
isleta Pueblo, a community of about 4,500 people, straddles the Rio
Grande River ten miles below the City of Albuquerque.52 Soon after the
EPA approved the Isleta standards, Albuquerque sought a preliminary
injunction to stop enforcement.5 3 The City's main concern was that the
Pueblo standards would have to be incorporated in a permit being
renewed for the Albuquerque waste treatment facility.5 4 The City was
preparing to meet a new and tougher state standard on the discharge of
ammonia. 55 The Isleta standard on ammonia was even more strict.5 6 At
the point of discharge about five miles above the Pueblo boundary, the
City's wastewater stream contained ten times more ammonia than the
Isleta standard allowed.57 Albuquerque estimated that it would have to
spend $250 million to comply with Isleta's water quality-based
standards, or $220 million more than the new state ammonia rule would
require.58 The EPA could not consider costs to Albuquerque, however,
in its review of Isleta's standards.5 9
A notable feature of Isleta's water quality standards is that they
designate ceremonial use for the Rio Grande's waters. 60  Pueblo
members were reluctant to describe the ceremonial use in detail, but said
that it includes ingestion.6 1  When Albuquerque's request for a
preliminary injunction came before the court, the ceremonial use
designation allowed the City to make a rather novel claim under the
Clean Water Act. Albuquerque argued that in approving a ceremonial
use, the EPA violated the Constitution's establishment clause by
promoting the Isleta Pueblo's religious practices at the City's expense. 62
The Pueblo conceded that its goal was to ensure that water it diverted
from the river would be fit for religious purposes. 63 The EPA argued,
however, that the primary purpose of its approval of the standards was to
River, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1685, 1993 (available in WESTLAW, BNA-Environment File).
50. Id.
51. Id.






57. Haederle, supra note 52, at A5.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1283 (SD. Fla. 1988).






achieve the secular goals of the Clean Water Act.64 The court agreed that
there was no entanglement of governmental and religious purposes
significant enough to make the EPA's approval unconstitutional,
65
though the administrative fecord reflects EPA participation in
discussions with Isleta about the appropriate stringency of standards
designed to achieve the ceremonial use designated. 66
Albuquerque also argued that the EPA misconstrued Section 518
by (a) approving tribal water quality standards more strict than the EPA
minimum standards and (b) imposing them on upstream dischargers.
The crux of these arguments was that tribes are not really supposed to be
treated like states in all respects, and they were given short shrift by the
trial court. With respect to the first, the court pointed out that this
construction of Section 518 would make the provision nugatory. 67 If a
tribe can promulgate water quality standards neither more nor less
stringent than EPA's minimums, it seems pointless to grant it rule-
making authority in the first place. Such a construction contradicts the
time-honored canon that Congress does not make empty gestures. With
respect to Albuquerque's second argument, the court simply drew the
City's attention to Arkansas68 and the court held that there was no
distinction between imposing the water quality standards of downstream
states on upstream states, on one hand, and imposing the standards of
downstream Indian tribes on upstream states, on the other. Discretionary
authority of the EPA administrator.
The court was not altogether comfortable with this situation,
however, and at the end of the opinion it said so. It pointed out that in
Arkansas the EPA took the position that the criterion for determining the
bearing of a downstream standard on an upstream discharge is whether
the discharge will measurably affect downstream water quality. 69 With
respect to the Isleta standards, however, the EPA was prepared to
condition the Albuquerque wastewater permit even though it had not
determined that water quality at Isleta would be measurably improved.
The court provided an example: the Pueblo's arsenic standard for the
Rio Grande is 1,000 times more stringent than the federal minimum.70 It
is actually below the concentration that can be accurately measured with
modem laboratory tools. Isleta threatened to impose this standard on
Albuquerque even though arsenic occurs naturally at higher levels in the
64. Id.
65. Browner, 865 F. Supp. at 740-41.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 739.
68. Id. at 740 (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992)).
69. Id. at 741. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
70. Browner, 865 F. Supp. at 742.
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region's well water and is not discharged by any industrial facility in the
City. No matter what the NPDES permits would say about it, arsenic
levels in water flowing by the Pueblo would probably exceed Isleta's
water quality standards.
Under Clean Water Act federalism as currently structured, there is a
fundamental choice. Either downstream regulators can impose
regulatory obligations on upstream users or upstream users can impose
damages on those downstream. In Arkansas, the EPA and the Supreme
Court took the side of the downstream users, but Should any jurisdiction
(state or tribe) be able to unilaterally impose costs up or downstream?
Viewing the problem as a matter of sovereign right one might say yes,
but one would still have to decide where the right resides. The
consequence for states and tribes is that the extent of regulatory
sovereignty under Clean Water Act federalism is largely dependent on
whether they are Upstream or Downstream people. For upstream tribes
(of which there are many) the current system threatens to impose costs
(mitigation costs, cleanup costs, or the costs of forgone development) for
the benefit of downstream states. A more environmentally sensitive and
fiscally sound regulatory system would not involve these geographic
contingencies. This brings us back at last to the Freestone River.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF POLLUTION
A. ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT APPROACH
In the language of economics, "the economically optimal level of
environmental quality is that for which the marginal social damages of
waste discharges equal marginal abatement cost." 7 1 In other words, we
do not want to pay more for pollution abatement than we get in return,
and at some point in any effort to abate pollution, we will reach the stage
where an additional investment of one dollar will yield less than a
dollar's worth of environmental benefits. The economist will say that
the last marginal investment made before that point is reached is the last
one that should be made; that the amount of environmental quality
purchased up to that point is the amount of environmental quality that is
economically optimal; or, seen from the opposite direction, that the
amount of pollution that persists after that point is the amount of
pollution that is economically optimal. The wisdom of the Clean Water
Act is that it decentralizes water quality-based effluent standards.
Conversely, nationally uniform technology-based standards are




inefficient because the optimal level of pollution is always local. The
following graph 72 shows why this is so.
MAC 1
0 E2  En  El
Effluent
The lesson is that any two regulatory jurisdictions may have
different economically optimal pollution levels. The optimal level of
pollution in each jurisdiction is the point where the marginal social
damages of waste equal the marginal social costs of abatement. On the
graph, the amount of pollution damage caused by releasing effluent into
the river is located on the horizontal axis. The amount of dollars spent
on abatement is on the vertical axis. For each jurisdiction, the point of
economically optimal pollution is reached where the curves labelled
MSD (marginal social damages) and MAC (marginal social costs) cross.
So, the optimal pollution level for each jurisdiction is represented on the
bottom line as E1 and E2, respectively, with E 1 being the jurisdiction in
which the optimal level is higher. The question, of course, is why do
MSDI-MACI and MSD 2-MAC 2 lie on separate points on the graph?
The answer is that in almost all cases the comparative marginal social
damages of pollution and costs of abatement are different.
72. See id. at 286 (providing a graph on which this article's graph is modeled).
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Consider the curves labelled MSD. These curves "represent a
vertical summation of individual curves of willingness-to-pay to avoid
the damages associated with the indicated levels of waste emission." 73
This is econo-speak for the proposition that people with a demand curve
of MSD 2 are willing to pay more to avoid a given level of pollution than
people with a demand curve of MSD 1 . Why would they be willing to do
so? Perhaps it is a matter of cultural commitment. Assume that the
people of MSD 2 are the members of Isleta Pueblo. The Isletans have a
greater willingness to pay for a given level of pollution than the people
of MSDI, the Albuquerqueans, because the Isletans, unlike the
Albuquerqueans, ingest water for religious purposes. There are, of
course, numerous other possibilities. In fact, the most likely scenario is
that the people of MSD 2 are simply city dwellers and the people of
MSDI are not. The aggregate willingness-to-pay curve is usually higher
for city dwellers just because there are many of them in a congested
place. And that is okay. Urbanites had better be willing to pay more
than their country cousins for a given level of pollution control because
they produce more pollution in the first place, and the more pollution
there is, the higher the marginal costs of cleanup.
Consider next the curves labelled MAC. Their positions on the
graph reflect the fact that the costs of avoiding a given level of pollution
may be different, too. The Freestone River, the reader will remember, is
a classic trout stream, but one of a special type. Let us say that it is a
snowmelt stream that careens through boulder-strewn passages filled with
rapids whose stirring action adds oxygen to the water, which trout
demand. Because the Freestone's bed is mostly granitic, however, it is
alkaline-poor, low in nutrients, and the trout are small. The Chalk River,
on the other hand, is a classic trout stream quite different in character. It
originates in permeable limestone hills where rainfall sinks into the
ground before resurfacing from alkaline-rich springs that feed the river.
The Chalk meanders quietly through a wide valley. Its alkaline water
promotes the growth of weedbeds and insect populations in the river's
pools. There is not much oxygen to spare in these pools, but the well-
fed trout that live in them are large. The Freestone and the Chalk offer
anglers different, but equally gratifying, experiences. Those who lobby
the legislature want assurances that both rivers will be fishable in the
future.
For a number of reasons, the cost of maintaining healthy trout




Freestone. Let us say that the Chalk runs through a well-populated and
fertile valley where there are many farms, some small towns, and several
factories. Because there is already a significant amount of agricultural,
municipal, and industrial waste going into the river, the marginal costs of
abatement are relatively high. In fact, they are high relative specifically
to the marginal costs of avoiding pollution of the Freestone because the
latter runs through a mountainous area where the main economic
activities are logging and livestock grazing. There is some siltation from
these activities, but that can be abated with better management practices,
most importantly by leaving riparian buffer zones. There are no
municipal waste treatment plants, and problems associated with septic
systems can be handled with more stringent design and location
regulations. The cost of installing septic tanks will be higher, but
probably not by much.
For these reasons alone, the marginal costs of pollution abatement
in the Freestone will be lower than in the Chalk, but there are other
factors that will also make that the case. The first has to do with stream
geomorphology. The fast moving waters of the Freestone will flush
pollutants more rapidly and add oxygen to the water more readily. This
means natural, cost-free mitigation of siltation and de-oxygenation from
logging and grazing. The second has to do with trout physiology.
Since the mountain waters of the Freestone are colder that those of the
lowland Chalk, the trout need less oxygen anyway. Trout in the Chalk
demand more oxygen, the slow moving river itself furnishes less, and the
heavily fertilized farms, with their nitrate and phosphate runoffs, put
more de-oxygenating material in the water. Add it all up and the Chalk
River is represented by the higher cost curve labelled MAC 1 on the
graph; the Freestone by MAC 2. If the MSD curves accurately reflect
willingness-to-pay to avoid pollution in the two watersheds, the
economically optimal level of pollution in the Chalk River, El, is higher
than in the Freestone, E2. In short, local standards yield optimal levels of
pollution.
The graph drives this point home by showing the negative outcome
that would result from nationally uniform water quality-based standards.
Assume that these standards would yield water pollution levels at En.
The thing to note is that because the national standards do not take local
conditions into account, the amount of pollution abatement achieved is
optimal for neither EI nor E2 . Our economist would say that the shaded
area represents an aggregate welfare loss (relative to the localized
standards) equal to "the excess of damages over abatement costs over
the range E2 to En (the loss in jurisdiction two) plus the excess of control
19951 487
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
costs over damages from E, to El (the loss in jurisdiction one)." 74 In
other words, there would be too much pollution in E2 and too much
expenditure on abatement in El. The first constitutes an economic loss
because it means that some damages could be efficiently avoided with
additional effort. The second constitutes an economic loss because it
means that some measures to abate pollution cost more than the value of
the environmental benefits produced. The losses in both watersheds
would be the result of national water quality-based standards. Recall that
the federal government does establish nationally uniform technology-
based standards. 7 5  These yield the same negative outcomes
demonstrated on the graph. They either obtain too little pollution
abatement or cost too much, depending on local conditions.76
B. How TO ACHIEVE EFmCIENCY
If national water quality-based standards are inherently inefficient,
the next question is how to identify the appropriate locality for setting
water quality standards. The answer is fairly straightforward. The key to
establishing locally optimal pollution levels is that the locality must be
large enough to contain all of the costs and benefits of pollution control.
The Isleta Pueblo case is a good example. Because Isleta Pueblo does
not contain all the costs and benefits of pollution control, Albuquerque
v. Browner is a zero-sum game. Depending on who has the right, either
Albuquerque can continue dumping amounts of arsenic excessive by
Isletan standards in the Rio Grande regardless of the social cost to Isleta,
or Isleta can prohibit it and impose the economic cost of prevention on
Albuquerque. Given the context, the latter result holds considerable
appeal. The Downstream People, after all, are innocent victims of the
Upstream People's effluent emissions, and they may be defenseless as
well. And, of course, this is the position adopted by the EPA and upheld
by the Supreme Court in Arkansas v. Oklahoma. 77
Consider another example. In any watershed, some pollutants will
be flushed downstream, some will settle into bottom sediments where
they will remain, and some will contaminate the river's fish. For many
74. Id. at 285.
75. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
76. In a very polluted river, for example, uniform technology-based standards could yield less
than the optimal amount of pollution. In such a case, of course, the local water quality standards
would, if they were accurate, kick in and ratchet pollution control downward. In an unpolluted river,
uniform technology-based standards could require unnecessary expenditures. In that case, on the
other hand, the local water quality standards would not help since they do not ratchet pollution control
downwards.
77. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
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tribes, the last possibility is particularly worrisome. Water quality
standards are set so that the (nationally) average person has one extra
chance in 100,000 of getting cancer from eating fish.78 This risk
assessment is based on the assumption that the (nationally) average
person consumes fewer than two ounces of fish each week. This amount
is far less, however, than the average consumption of the many Native
Americans whose diet is. based on fish. A study recently conducted by
the Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission found that the average
Nez Perce, for example, eats twelve times more fish than the average
person on whom the EPA risk assessment is based, which would translate
to at least ten extra cancers per million.79
The Columbia River tribes are understandably concerned about
pulp and paper mills discharging dioxins and other pollutants that enter
the food chain. The Isletans may be able to distill the water they remove
from the Rio Grande for religious purposes, at tremendous expense to
themselves, but the only way to deal with carcinogenic fish-other than to
quit eating it-is to control pollution at the source. To do that, the
Columbia River tribes have announced their intention to seek EPA
approval of their own water quality-based effluent standards, enforceable
upstream. As one tribal leader put it, "[w]e will not quit eating fish.
Fish is not just food to us. It is a way of life." 80 On the other side, the
pulp and paper mills upstream are worried (also understandably) about
the costs of complying with stringent tribal regulations. Spokesmen for
the mills suggest that the regulations should be based on the EPA's
(nationally) average person rather than on the average person in "a
sensitive population." 81 Both sides have legitimate concerns. On one
hand, the tribes of the Columbia watershed are "sensitive populations"
largely in relation to a national standard set by the EPA. On the other,
they share the Columbia basin with many non-tribal members.
In fact, the economically optimal solution is one that takes the
benefits and costs imputed to both tribal and non-tribal members into
account. In the world of our economist, homo economicus tries to
externalize costs wherever he can. If he is an owner of a pulp or paper
mill, he may try to do so by discharging untreated effluent in the river
where it will flow downstream and do no harm to him. If he is a
78. See EPA, QuALnrY CRITERIA FOR WATER, Appendix B (1986).
79. See Paul Shukovsky, Tribes Take on Pollution: Greater Risk in Eating Fish Spurs Action,
SEATrLE POST-INTELLuiGEcER, Sept. 7, 1993, at AL. Many individual Nez Perce consume 67 times the
average amount factored into the EPA risk assessment. Id. Other tribes in the Columbia basin are
now conducting their own studies. It is expected that they will also reveal consumption levels far
above the national average. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Harry Smiskin, tribal elder, Nez Perce tribe).
81. Id. (quoting Konrad Liegel, attorney representing several pulp and paper companies).
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downstream regulator, he may try to do so by shifting pollution control
costs upstream. Even if the Isletans could distill enough water for their
religious uses at a relatively modest cost, they might try to send the costs
of purification upstream anyway, unless they are paradigm-busting
altruists whose sole concern is the larger general welfare. If the
"locality" is not geographically large enough to contain all benefits and
costs of pollution and pollution control, these negative externalities will
likely persist.
The ideal locality for regulatory purposes is one in which all such
costs and benefits are internalized. Internalization prompts stakeholders
to make completely informed decisions about tolerable levels of
pollution. Pulp and paper mills, for example, are prompted to consider
not just the costs of land, labor, and capital in making production
decisions, but also the environmental damage their production processes
cause. Just as importantly, the beneficiaries of production are prompted
to consider how many goods and services they would be willing to
relinquish to obtain a cleaner environment. Continuing the Columbia
River example, local tribes might have to consider how many job
opportunities for tribal members they would forgo to obtain a given
level of pollution reduction. Defining regulatory authority as a
collective power (by defining jurisdiction so as to encompass all
interested parties, upstream and downstream) effectively internalizes the
cost of pollution and abatement, and forces all interested parties to
engage in rational decision making. This is why we should be
concerned about further balkanizing the Clean Water Act by giving
tribes the regulatory status of states and, for the same reason, about
giving states the regulatory status of states, too.
Istead, the obvious locality for internalizing costs and benefits is at
the level of the watershed, defined as "a geographic area in which water,
sediments, and dissolved materials drain to a common outlet, a point on a
larger stream, a lake, an underlying aquifer, or an ocean."8 2 Peter
Menell and Richard Stewart describe the basic concept of watershed
management as follows:
The [watershed protection] approach would administer
watersheds as complete units defined by their underlying
hydrology, rather than managing individual portions of
watersheds according to arbitrarily defined political
boundaries. This administrative structure would include
management of all waters, including surface and ground waters,
82. EPA O-FCE OF WATER, THE WATERSHED PROTECTION APPROACH: AN OVERVIEW 1 (1991)
[hereinafter WATERSHED PROTECTION APPROACH].
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and both inland and coastal waters. In addition, it would
encompass management of the land from which water drains
into a particular watershed. All aspects of the watershed's
quality would be considered under this approach in an
integrated way, including chemical water quality, physical water
quality, habitat quality, and biodiversity. Issues of water
quantity, including basic demand and supply, would also be
included in the [watershed protection] approach.8 3
Essentially, watershed management is a risk-prioritized regulatory
system that takes into account the ecological and hydrological structure
of the basin, the sources and types of pollution problems, the economic
uses of the water, and the level of resources available for watershed
protection and restoration.
The stages through which a watershed plan is developed and
implemented are also described by Menell and Stewart:
First appropiate watersheds are identified and mapped.
Second, all of the "stakeholders" in the watershed are
assembled to analyze the threats to the watershed, and to devise
responses to these threats based on a risk-based analysis. These
stakeholders would include state governmental, public health,
agriculture, and natural resource agencies, local environmental
regulatory boards and commissions, Indian tribes,
representatives of the public and of environmental groups, and
industry and development interests. In the third step, the
selected response mechanisms are applied to the watershed's
problems. Progress towards achieving water quality goals is
then regularly monitored, and adjustments are made in
response mechanisms as required.84
This basic approach to water quality protection is likely to be increa-
singly important. It is sensible on ecological grounds and, it accounts
for all costs, benefits, and related risks. Reaching consensus in this
multi-party setting, of course, is much easier said than done. In fact,
three rather sticky transaction problems immediately arise. The first of
these is whether things like religious impacts and health effects can
actually be assigned a monetary value. A second is whether anything
like complete information on costs and benefits can be acquired. The
third is whether stakeholders can expend the time and effort necessary to
83. PErR S. MENEIL & RICHARD B. STEwART, ENVo mNrA1L LAW AND PoLicY 514 (1994).
84. Id. at 514-15.
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reach bargained-for solutions.8S My intuition is that these various
obstacles are formidable, but not necessarily insuperable.
An example is the Stillaguamish Watershed Protection Project in
Washington state.8 6 The Stillaguamish is a relatively small watershed.
The river begins on the west slope of the north Cascades and runs for a
little more than 100 miles to its outlet into Puget Sound. The principal
pollutants are bacteria from livestock wastes, sediment from farms,
logging operations, and development, and wastewater from sewage
disposal systems. In the 1980s, pollution in the watershed forced the
shutdown of commercial shellfishing in Port Susan at the river's mouth.
In 1988, the Stillaguamish and Tulalip Tribes obtained a grant from the
State of Washington's Department of Ecology to form a watershed task
force to develop a plan to deal with these problems. The resulting
Watershed Management Committee includes representatives of the tribes,
county and city governments, environmental and business interest
groups, and citizens' organizations. Scientists from the Department of
Ecology and the EPA serve on a Technical Advisory Committee. The
Stillaguamish Watershed Action Plan, completed in 1989, consists of
integrated source control programs, a monitoring and enforcement
system, and a public education agenda that has facilitated
implementation. The result has been a community-based effort that has
led to a broader understanding of environmental problems and how to
deal with them.
IV. CONCLUSION: PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND THE ROLE OF
TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS IN REGULATORY REFORM
The hard question, of course, is what comprehensive basinwide
management should entail in a watershed as large as the Rio Grande's.
A good place to look for the answer is across the country from the
Stillaguamish, in the Tennessee River Valley. Three years ago, the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) adopted the goal of making the
Tennessee River "the cleanest and most productive commercial river
system in the United States by the year 2000."87 At 652 miles, the
Tennessee River is the sixth largest river system in the United States, with
a watershed encompassing parts of six states.88 TVA plans to employ
multi-disciplinary River Action Teams in each of the system's twelve
85. For a good introduction to valuation issues and information costs in cost-benefit analysis, see
id. at 82-101.
86. WATERSHED PROTEMCON APPROACH, supra note 82, at 4.
87. TVA, FISHNET ACTION PLAN: CREATING ECONOMIC ADVAwrAGE THROUGH EwRmotNmwrAL
STEwARDsHiP, SuMMARY 2 (1993) [hereinafter ISHNET ACTION PLAN].
88. The states are Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi.
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relatively distinct sub-basins.89 Their mandate: is "to coordinate efforts
across political boundaries."90 Their members are technical experts who
spend much of their time working with non-experts (resource users,
communities, industries, special interest groups, and other government
agencies) to "develop and promote strategies that balance human use
and ecological integrity of the resource."91 This has the ring, no doubt,
of bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo, but in this case, the early results actually
seem promising. 92 Here, I merely want to highlight two sets of issues
with which TVA is dealing.
First, and critical to any effective watershed approach, is a
comprehensive monitoring program. TVA's goes beyond the
conventional physio-chemical assessment techniques to include
bioassessment, a technique using living organisms to assess water quality,
which is especially important in monitoring and assessing the health of
fish populations. TVA is now "a leader in biomonitoring applications
[with] other agencies [expected] to follow TVA's lead over the next
decade." 93 In addition, the River Action Teams are "breaking new
ground in the approach they are using in interpreting and digitizing
airphoto data," 94 which permits analysis of land use patterns and trends.
The collection of physical, chemical, biological, and visual data enables
the agency to recommend holistic approaches to watershed problems,
but this also requires a clear understanding of the linkage between
resource conditions and the pollutant sources that cause degradation. It
is essential if assessment is actually to lead to integrated regulation by the
states, local governments, and other regulatory authorities in the
watershed.95
Second, the move- from comprehensive assessment to integrated
regulation provides a benchmark for comparison, a vision of the
watershed's desired future condition, and a set of implementable
management goals. In a multijurisdictional watershed, these require a
manageable geographic scale, a party willing to take the lead in
consensus building, a strong public education effort, inclusion of
89. FisHNLr AcinoN PLAN, supra note 87, at 4. These include six segments of the mainstem and
the six main tributaries.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 5.
92. Water Quality 2000, an organization composed of 70 national governmental and non-
governmental groups working in the water quality field, was recently invited to evaluate the TVA
program. The Water Quality 2000 report holds up the TVA program as a watershed model. See
WATER QUALITY 2000, A NATIONAL WATER AGENDA FOR Tm 21ST CENruRY, WATER QuALITY 2000
FINAL REPORT, 3 (1992).
93. Id. at 8.
94. Id. at 12.
95. Id.
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stakeholders, coordination of monitoring efforts, and flexibility in the
planning and regulatory process. 96 The agency has developed a
systematic procedure for identifying hierarchically nested watershed
management units. 97 Each of the twelve Tennessee Valley sub-basins is
divided into several resource units ranging in size from 72 to 351 square
miles. At these sub-basin and resource unit levels, water quality planning
can be reduced to manageable proportions, while at the same time
basinwide monitoring and assessment can give a picture of the entire
watershed.
Clearly, the Tennessee River program is an ambitious undertaking.
Can tribal governments be asked, realistically, to take on anything like
such a project? Few watersheds are as small as the Stillaguamish and its
sister streams that drain the west slope of the Cascades into Puget Sound.
In a watershed like the Rio Grande or the Tennessee, the transaction costs
associated with comprehensive watershed planning will be very large.
Integrated management could be implemented by defining sub-basin
management units on the basis of hydrology, physiographic boundaries,
problem areas, and critical issues. That would reduce transaction costs,
but certainly not eliminate them. Stakeholders might agree on goals for
conventional and toxic pollutant levels, water temperature, channel
morphology, health of biotic communities, and so on. They might reach
consensus on the tools needed to meet these objectives: standards for
ambient water quality, best management practices for non-point source
pollution, end-of-the-pipe standards for point source pollution, and
remediation of degraded stream segments. 98 They might even agree to
accommodate hard-to-monetize values like the ceremonial uses of Isleta
Pueblo, but the organizational effort that would be required to reach
these kinds of decisions could be expensive indeed.99
Still, there is another lesson from Isleta Pueblo. After winning in
the trial court on the substantive issue of whether its ceremonial use
standards were permissible under the Clean Water Act, the Pueblo
96. Id. at 29.
97. Id. at 7.
98. WATERSHED PROThcTON APPROACH, supra note 82, at 2.
99. This may be the main reason why the TVA model will be difficult to apply outside of the
TVA context. The TVA is an experiment in something larger than even watershed planning; it is an
experiment in a new kind of federalism itself. The TVA has had valuable experience in forging
cooperative working relationships with other federal, state, and local agencies. For the history of the
TVA, see W.MON HENRY DROZE, HIGH DAMS AND SlAcK WATERS: TVA REBUILDS ARIVER (1986);
WILLIAM U. CHANDLER, THE MYTH OF TVA: CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE TENNESSEE
VALLEY, 1933-1983 (1984); AS. B ARNES, TVA: BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATERS (1980). One could
hardly say that the agency has an admirable record as an environmental steward, but if it really has
turned a new leaf, it has the institutional capacity to be a watershed consensus-builder. That may be
much more difficult for tribal governments, or, indeed, for any other governmental institution in a
large watershed without a regional mandate.
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returned to the table with Albuquerque and agreed on the disputed water
quality effluent limitations that both parties have now accepted.10o The
agreed upon standard is the result of Isleta'.s using its leverage as a new
player in watershed decision making to achieve some of its goals while
accommodating other interests to some extent as well. This leverage can
be acquired by any tribal government obtaining status as a state under
the Clean Water Act. For that matter, it is a leverage that can be used by
downstream states. If we consider the reach of river between
Albuquerque and Isleta Pueblo as a distinct sub-basin from the
perspective of environmental geography, we begin to see how the
Downstream People can use their jurisdictional authority to change the
outlines of Clean Water Act federalism for the better.
The current structure of the Clean Water Act, which vests regulatory
authority in political units unrelated to environmental geography, is
fractured along lines that lead away from either good economics or
good environmental policy. Moreover, giving tribes the status of states
under the Clean Water Act opens the fractures even wider, something the
basic principles of ecology and economics would surely counsel against.
We do not need less integrated planning on a basinwide scale.
Nevertheless, as long as Clean Water Act federalism is structured as it is,
one is hard-put to suggest that tribal governments accept this counsel.
Tribes ought to seek regulatory authority under the Clean Water Act
simply to assure that their voices will be heard in the arena of watershed
politics. But obtaining such status begs the central question raised in this
paper: if tribal members acquire the bargaining power that belongs to
the Downstream People in our current federal system, what should they
do with it? My answer is that they should use their new leverage against
upstream polluters to promote good economics and good environmental
policy by encouraging a shift toward regulatory planning at a watershed
scale. Political boundaries are contingencies of human history; we come
to geographical boundaries with our hats in our hands.
100. New Mexico, Daily Environment Report, State Roundup (BNA), 1994 DEN 219 (April 26,
1994) (available in WESTLAW, BNA-Environment File). Albuquerque's appeal of the trial court's
decision is thus limited to procedural issues related to the EPA's determination that Isleta Pueblo would
be granted the status of a state. Id.
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